




After more than twenty years of work on
what has been called a "monetarist counter-
revolution" to Keynesian economic thought,'
the economics profession again has come to
acknowledge the importance of the money
supply in determining inflation and changes in
nominal GNP. Most economists would agree
that, in the long run, the level of the money
supply has no sustained effects on output, but
solely affects prices. Furthermore, most would
also agree that non-monetary (cost-push) fac-
tors can have a sustained effect on the inflation
rate only if they are accommodated or "vali-
dated" by increases in the money supply.
Given the widespread agreement on these
points, thedebate on the causes ofinflation and
the proper anti-inflation policy then revolves
around the following issue: what factors have
typically caused movements in the rate of
money-supply growth. Inflation has continued
and accelerated over the last fifteen to twenty
years, as has growth in the money supply.
What's more, it is generally agreed-and con-
firmed by existing evidence-that inflation
could not have continued for this long without
accompanying money-supply growth. It fol-
lows, then, that the underlying causes of infla-
tion are fhose which can be convincingly shown
to have caused money-supply growth-either
directly or indirectly-over this period.
The present paper follows this argument by
conducting tests of cost-push and government-
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spending theories of inflation. It applies the
Granger causality-test technique to determine
whether various "causes" of inflation have sys-
tematically caused, or been caused by, money-
supply growth. These results then provide evi-
dence as to whether the respective variables
have indeed systematically caused recent U.S.
inflation. Furthermore, we argue that this tech-
nique is indeed more powerful than those com-
monly applied to such theories.
The arguments for the possible effects of
various inflation indicatorson the moneysupply
take many forms. With respect to the cost-
push theory of inflation, many analysts argue
that central banks are forced to expand money
and credit in response to large cost increases
in various industries in order to avoid the out-
put losses and unemployment that would nor-
mally follow such phenomena. By "accom-
modating" such increases through monetary
expansion, a slump is avoided, but at the cost
of eventually higher inflation. These cost in-
creases thus cause sustained inflation through
their effect on the money supply. In the ab-
sence of accommodation, such increases pri-
marily would cause changes in relative prices
and temporary losses in output, but at most
only temporary increases in the general price
level.
As for the effects of government spending
(deficits) on the money supply, analysts fre-
quently argue that central banks monetize (ac-
commodate) large government deficits rather
than financing through tax increases or through
government-debt issues which would raise in-
terest rates. Though the monetization even-
tually leads to inflation, those favoring such an
approach argue that this is politically prefera-ble to the alternatives, at least in the short-
run.
The next section of this paper presents a
short analysis of the theory underlying our ap-
proach. It discusses the necessity of accompa-
nying money-supply growth in order to have
continuing inflation, and therefore uses the "ac-
commodation" hypothesis to substantiate cost-
push theories ofinflation. Section II applies the
Granger causality test technique to U.S. data
for the 1959-79 period, as a means of testing
these accommodation hypotheses for various
measures of cost-push or government-spend-
ing-basedinflationary pressure. Section III ana-
lyzes the episodic evidence on the money-in-
flation relationship for two particularly prominent
inflation periods: the post-oil-crisis period of
1974-75, and the recent 1978-79 period. Sec-
tion IV concludes with a discussion of the im-
plications of these results.
To summarize the results, we find virtually
no evidence of monetary accommodation of
cost-push or "supply shock" variables, despite
testing over seventeen indicators of such pres-
sures with respect to four measures of the
money supply. In the majority of cases, the
result indicates "one-way causality" emanating
from several or all of the money-supply mea-
sures to the respective price or cost indicator.
These results are especially prevalent with re-
spect to wage and unit-labor-cost indicators.
On the other hand, the results are less conclu-
sive for government spending and deficit mea-
sures. Some of these indicators display causal
effects on the money supply, but these results
are either unsatisfactory in some way or are
subject to conceptual problems involving the
form of the equations themselves. The general
tenor of these results remains the same when
the estimation form for the respective relations
is altered in different ways. In addition, pre-
vious and/or concurrent money-supply growth
is found to provide a reasonable explanation
of most of the inflation occurring in both 1974-
75 and 1978-79.
I. Conceptual Issues Behind the Money-Price Interrelationship
To reiterate, most economists would agree can be found in early post-war inflation surveys
that inflationcannotcontinue without an accom- and early discussions of various types of cost-
panying increase in the money supply. Infla- push or supply-side inflation theories-e.g.,
tion is essentially a tendency for all prices to Schlesinger (1957), Haberler (1959), and
continue to rise, with little or no attendant Bronfenbrenner and Holzman (1963), the last
movements in workers, capital, or goods of which lists many more such examples. This
among industries. And only a change in mon- literature generally recognizes that in and of
etary conditions, viz. an increase in the money themselves, supply-side shocks are sources of
supply, can plausibly generate such an increase only temporary inflationary pressure, and be-
in all prices with little or no side-effects on the come sources of ongoing inflation only when
real economy. Any other disturbance would they are accommodated by the monetary sys-
change the prices of some goods relative to tem.
others-raising some, lowering others-and This being the case, it's surprising that most
would therefore induce movements of re- empirical tests of supply-side inflation theories
sources among industries, but not necessarily have completely ignored what Schlesinger calls
any increase in prices in general. However, "the monetary environment," and have in-
because .economic actors can be expected to stead attempted to identify statistical relations
base their decisions on real conditions and on between the price level and the particular
relative prices among goods, rather than solely "causal" factor under consideration-e.g.,
on money prices, an increase in the supply of Means (1935, 1972) and Wachtel and Adelsh-
money (and thence in all money prices) leaves eim (1976). The problem with such tests is that
these real conditions and relative prices un- positive results are then equally consistent with
changed, and so results in a pure inflation.
2 a wide variety of conflicting inflation theories.
Many detailed discussions of this approach For example, suppose a wage-push study
51finds a relation between wage increases and
inflation. This might signify the existence of
wage-push. However, even in a monetary the-
ory of inflation, increasing money supplies are
considered to raise demand for goods and fac-
tors, and so to raise prices and wages. In such
a theory, wages might be said to respond to
money before prices, or the labor market
might be considered part of the transmission
mechanism whereby higher money supplies
lead to higher goods prices. Either develop-
ment then could imply a statistical relation be-
tween wages and prices. Thus, a relationship
between wages and prices could exist under a
number of theories, and so in and of itself, it
provides no compelling evidence of the exist-
ence of wage-push pressure. Similarly for
other indicators, without evidence regarding
the effect of various factors on the "monetary
environment," it's impossible to tell whether
the existence of a statistical relation between
inflation and a given indicator represents cause
or effect: whether the indicator causes infla-
tion, or whether money-supply growth causes
both the indicator and the price level to rise.
Consequently, evidence on monetary ac-
commodation is crucially important in identi-
fying inflation's causes. Again, an increasing
money supply is the one absolutely necessary
symptom, the sine qua non, of any inflation.
Holding milk prices frozen, or clothing prices,
or even oil or auto prices, while allowing other
inflationary phenomena to continue, would not
materially change the nature of the inflation
process. However, holding the money supply
fixed, though letting other factors continue to
rise, would soon bring any inflation to a sudden
halt. Therefore, identifying some factor as a
systematic cause of monetary expansion is the
one reliable way to mark that factor as a cause
of the inflation.
Yet very few studies have taken this ap-
proach in discussing the causes of inflation.
Even monetary analyses have made little at-
tempt to document the causes of monetary ex-
pansion as rigorously as they document the
effects of money on prices. There are some
exceptions, such as Gordon (1977), Bazdarich
(1978), and various studies of Federal Reserve
reaction functions, such as Barro (1979). Of
these, only Gordon and Bazdarich attempt to
identify causes of inflation, and then only with
a very small number of variables for a number
of countries.
The present study, in contrast, considers an
exhaustive list of possible indicators of U.S.
inflation. We perform Granger causality tests
for these indicators to determine whether they
can be identified as systematic causes of mon-
etary expansion, and thence inflation. Now one
might contend that monetary accommodation
is typically an episodic process- that mone-
tary authorities react to different factors at
different times-and that tests for systematic
effects are therefore likely to miss important
effects. Yet we argue at length that systematic
effects are necessary if we are to obtain objec-
tively meaningful results, although we also
analyze two major inflation episodes to illus-
trate the predictive power of various inflation
theories over shorter periods of time.
II. Evidence of Systematic Accommodation
The Granger causality method, which we
use here to test the various inflation theories,
asserts that a variable x "Granger causes" a
variable y if fluctuations in x can be used to
predict subsequent movements in y, that is, if
fluctuations in x are systematically transmitted
to y. For example, consider the equation
where x, and y, are values of x and y at time t,
and where Eit is a random disturbance term.
If the C'Y1' 'Yz' ... 'Ym) vector is non-zero, then
past x values can be used to predict current y
values (even when the past history of y is con-
sidered as well through the ~iYI-jterms), so that




x, = 3 + ~nl.x'_·1 + ~1fJ...·IYI-.·1 + EZI' J-·l,. 1-" (2)the (f.Lp f.Lz' ..., f.LJ vector is non-zero, y is
said to "Granger cause" x. When x "Granger
causes" y, and y "Granger causes" x, two-way
"feedback" exists between the variables.
When x "Granger causes" y, but the converse
doesn't hold, x is said to be econometrically
exogenous to y-and similarly for the reverse.
On philosophical grounds, one would be
hard pressed to assert that empirical evidence
could be used to identify as metaphysical a
concept as causality.3 Thus the phrase "Gran-
ger cause" is substituted for "cause" in order
to emphasize the philosophical shortcomings
as well as the particularstatistical phenomenon
(that of predictive power) which is being iden-
tified. Still, it can be argued that the Granger-
causality concept is quite relevant to our
"causes of inflation" issues. In discussing the
monetary accommodation issue, we cannot
easily determine in what sense disturbances
such as large wage settlements or oil-price in-
creases truly cause the monetary system to ex-
pand credit. Rather, the issue is whether this
process can systematically explain observed in-
creases in the money supply, and the Granger
technique would seem to be well suited for this
purpose.
The existence of significant, positive causal
effects from money-supply measures to infla-
tion measures would tend to confirm the stan-
dard monetary analyses ofinflation.
4 The exist-
ence ofsignificant, positive causal effects from
cost-push or government-spending indicators
to money-supply indicators would indicate the
existence of systematic monetary accommo-
dation of these variables, so that they could
indeed be deemed basic causes of inflation.
These effects would have to be generally pos-
itive in order to show that the monetary au-
thorities typically react to accommodate these
factors, rather than perhaps countering them,
which negative coefficients would suggest.
To estimate equations of the form in (1) and
(2), one must choose finite values for the lag-
lengths n, m, r, and s. Clearly, experimentation
would allow one to find the values in each
equation that best fit the data. However, such
a procedure inevitably involves "peeking" at
the data, and would inevitably affect the na-
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ture of the results. To avoid this problem, all
tests were performed with a standard equation
form using eight lags of each variable in equa-
tions (1) and (2).5 The eight lags were consid-
ered sufficient to pick up the lagged effects of
money on prices and wages, and vice versa.
Following the initial tests, alternative estima-
tion forms were also used.
Theoretical discussions ofthe Granger caus-
ality technique suggest the use of non-season-
ally adjusted data, since seasonal-adjustment
techniques can perhaps distort the statistical
interrelation between two variables. We fol-
lowed this approach as much as possible, add-
ing seasonal dummies to pick up deterministic
seasonality, while relying on the lagged de-
pendent variables to prevent stochastic season-
ality common to both variables from showing
up as statistical causality.6
We performed our tests with quarterly data
for the period 1957.1-1979.2, but dropped the
first nine quarters from our sample period to
generate lagged values and rates of change.7
We used rates-of-change data to induce sta-
tionarity in the series, as well as for analytical
reasons mentioned earlier.
H We chose cost-
push indicators which could represent specific
effects, but still be general enough to be rec-
ognized-and perhaps reacted to-by the
monetary authorities. We utilized four mone-
tary aggregates-M-l (currency plus bank de-
mand deposits), M-2 (currency plus all bank
deposits except large time certificates), the
source base (sources of the monetary base as
defined by the Federal Reserve Board of Gov-
ernors), and the St. Louis base (the monetary
base, adjusted for reserve requirement changes,
as defined by the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis).9 We calculated F-statistics to test the
significance of each explanatory variable in
"Granger causing" the respective dependent
variable. A significant F-statistic indicates evi-
dence ofGranger causality for the explanatory
variable in question- that is, it implies that
the )I-vector in forms of equation (1), or the
f.L-vector in equation (2), is significantly differ-
ent from a zero vector.
In testing our money-price relation, the F-
statistic of 2.9 represents an effect of M-l onthe consumer-price index that is significant at
the I-percent level (Table I, line I). The long-
run effect of 1.6 indicates that any sustained
one-percentage-point change in the M-l
growth rate would generally eventually result
in a 1.6-percentage-point change in the CPI
inflation rate in the same direction. III The F-
statistic of 2.6 indicates an effect of CPI infla-
tion on M-I growth that is significant at the 5-
percent level, while the long-run effect of 0.1
indicates that a one-percentage-point change
in the CPI inflation rate would eventually result
in a O.l-percentage-point change in the M-l
growth rate. The results for the other mone-
tary indicators and the CPI can be equivalently
interpreted.
All four monetary indicators have effects on
the CPI with some degree of significance, as
monetary theories would lead one to expect.
On the other hand, the CPI has significant
effects only on M-I and M-2. This by itself
need not be damaging to an accommodation
hypothesis, since it could be argued that ac-
commodation should show up in the Federal
Reserve's traditional policy variables, M-I and
M-2, rather than in variables which the Fed
targets only indirectly, such as the monetary-
base indicators. (Even so, such accommoda-
tion, if significant, should be expected to show
up to some extent in the base indicators, which
are certainly affected by Fed open-market op-
erations). Nevertheless, a more serious prob-
lem with interpreting the significant effect of
the CPI on M-1 and M-2 as evidence of accom-
modation is that the signs of the significant
coefficients for the CPI effects are negative at
the shorter lags, and become positive only at
the longer lags. In other words, the equations
suggest that given a disturbance to CPI infla-
tion, the Fed initially acts to counter rather
than accommodate this disturbance, while its
estimated reaction becomes and stays positive
only after a substantial lag (twenty-five quar-
ters!), and even then only at an insignificant
level. Thus, despite the significant effects of
the CPI on M-I and M-2, the tests involving
that variable do not show much sign of system-
atic accommodation by the Fed.
Much the same is true for other consumer-
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price variables. Most of the monetary indica-
tors have significant effects on consumer food
prices and the CPI excluding food. Significant
reverse effects are shown only for the CPI
excluding food on M-1. In this case, as seen
already with the entire CPI on M-1 and M-2,
the effects at the shorter lags are negative,
with the estimated equation showing no real
sign of accommodative tendencies by the Fed.
For the GNP price deflators-for both total
GNP and personal consumption-the results
generally display strong one-way causality
from the money-supply variables to the price
indices, with no sign of systematic monetary
accommodation.
The wholesale (producer) price variables
similarly show no sign ofaccommodation. Vir-
tually all are significantly affected by M-l and
various other monetary indicators. Yet, signif-
icant reverse effects are shown only from steel
and metals prices onto M-2. Here again, the
long-run effects of these variables on M-2 are
small and likely insignificant. Also, these var-
iables show no significant effects on M-I,
which in the past two decades has surely been
a more prominent indicator of Fed policy than
M-2. In fact, the effects of steel and metals
prices on M-2-in the absence ofeffects on M-
1- may reflect business-cycle factors. Metals
and steel prices are very cyclically sensitive.
Similarly, because disintermediation in times
ofcyclically high interest rates normally affects
M-2 more than M-1, it would appear that a
large portion ofdisparate movements between
M-I and M-2 would reflect cyclical factors.
Thus, the estimated relationship between M-2
and steel and metals prices (and the lack of
such a relation for M-l) may reflect the exist-
ence of similar cyclical behavior in these vari-
ables.
As for labor-market indicators, we see ab-
solutely no sign of accommodation effects on
any of the monetary indicators of movements
in either wages or unit labor costs (Table I).
Unit-labar-cost data are available only in sea-
sonally adjusted form, so that those particular
results should be interpreted with caution, but
the results are completely consistent with those
for the wage data. The general result indicatesTable 1
Causality Results Between Various Economic Indicators and the Monetary Aggregates
Eight Lags for all Variables, 1959.2-1979.2*
M-l M-2 St. Louis Base Source Base
Consumer Prices F' LR' F' LR' F' LR' F LR F' LR' F' LR: F LR' F' LR:
All Items 2.Y**" I.h 2.6** 0.1 2. 1** J.l eY 11.\ IT 1 1 Ill) 11.1 1 1*" Ill) 1, 0.11
Food e.6" 1.9 1.6 ·0.1 2.2* " IS 1.6 lie e.4" 1.2 1.11 III I.:" 11.l) 1.1 IU)
Excluding food 1.7 7 3.Y~'* IU 1.2 I 7 IS 11.\ I.~' 1.2 11.l) 11.2 e.1 Ill) I 3 11.2
Wholesale Prices
All Items 2.H*** 2.3 11.6 --IU 2.2** I.l) Ill) lI.e 1.1 IS IU 11.11 1 1*" I I II.X -11.2
Non·Farm I.lJ' 2.2 II.~ -11.1 J.() I.lJ IS 11.2 IIlJ 1.\ IlA 11.11 3.11'" 1.2 11.7 -11.-1
Farm 2A" 2A II.:" -11.\ I.:" 2.11 11.7 11.1 J.l I.:" IU 0.11 I.X' Ol) 11.7 III
Metals 2.4** 2A 11.l) - 0.1 IA I.l) L,'" 11.1 I.l)" I.:" 1.6 11.11 2.5** 1..\ 11.7 -II:"
Steel 1.2 2A 1.6 0.1 1.11 1.7 2,H'~ '" 11.1 I.:" 1.6 1I.l) 11.11 2.0* 1A 11.6 -II:"
Fuel 2.3** 3.X 11.7 11.11 1.6 3.1 1.11 11.1 I.l)* 2.7 11.7 III 1.7 27 O.l) --112
Petroleum 2.1 3.1 II~ 11.1 1.1 e.1I 1.11 11.1 1 1 I.lJ 11.\ III 1.-1 I.l) 11.6 -11.\
Wages for
Nonagricultural
Workers' 2.5** II.:" 11.7 11..\ 2.4** 11..\ 11.6 II:? l.X"'*," II.:" 1.11 11.7 _"l)*'* - 1..\ 11.7 II.:"
Manufacturing 1.2 IS 11.7 II.:" e.3** IS I I II.:" 3.l)*'* 1 1 Ill) 11.1 3.7**" 1 1 1.11 II.e
Unit Labor Costs
Private Business 2.7*' 1.6 II~ IU 1.7 U 1.11 II.:" 1.-1 I I 11.7 IU 2,4** 1.11 11.2 11.7
Manufacturing 1.7 1.6 IIA 11.I IA I I II.~ II:? U II.X Ill) 11.1 I.X' Ill) 0.6 11.7
Non·farm 2.7** 1.6 IIA IU 1.7 U 11.7 IIA I.X' 1 1 Ol) II:? 2.()* Ill) IU -11.7
Unemployment Rates
All Workers' .3.2*** U 11.6 II:? 1A -IU 1.2 11.2 I.:" 11.6 I.l) IU II.X IIA 0.\ III
Males 25·44' 3.5*** 11.7 IIA lUI 2.1 -0.7 U 11.1 I.~* -11.2 Ol) 112 II:? 11.11 II.~ -Ill
Implicit Deflators
GNP 3.2*** 1.3 1 I II,:" 2.3** 1.1 1 1 11.6 2.7** 1.11 1.11 11..\ 1.6 Ill) 2.11* -11.6
Personal 2.4** U 1.11 11..\ 2.6** I.e 1.2 II.:" 1.7 1.11 II.~ IU 2.2** II~ 1I.l) --1.11
Consumption
Expenditures
Government 1.7* :".11 e.3** 11.I 11.5 2.2 I. X' ,lie 11.7 16.h 0.1 I.X' 1511 2.11' 11.1
Deficit'
Deficit/GNP II.~ 11.1 lI.h 11..\ 1.1 IIA lI.h 11.2 11.7 II.X 11.6 11.1 1.1 11.7 I 1 II.:"
Ratio·H •
Government
Spending' II.X 11.7 1..\ 11.1 05 0.6 2.:'\"* Il.e 1.0 11.7 11.7 -1I.e 1.11 11.7 Ill) 11.\
*First column of each set shows F-statistic for effect of respective monetary aggregate on "cost" variahlc: second column shows long-run effect for this
relation; third column shows F~statistic for eHecI of ·'cost" variahie on respective monetary aggregate: fourth column shov.'s long·run effect for this
relation.
'Significant at 10 percent level.
**Significant at 5 percent level.
***Significant at I percent level.
'F-Statistic for hypothesis that explanatory variable has no effect.
.'Long-run effect of a permanent one-percentage-point change in explanatory varlahk on dependent variahks: sec Appendix 1
'Sample period: 1%6.2-llJ7l).2.
'''Cost'' variable is in level form.
'Level of deficit vs. first difference of supply.
'Sample period: IlJ5l):2-1lJ7~:4
55one-way causality from the monetary indica-
tors to the labor-market indicators.
Haberler has suggested that central banks
typically react more to unemployment rates
than wages, and that wage increases exert sus-
tainedeffectsoninflation by initially raising un-
employment, which the authorities then
counter by monetary expansion.II Thus, he
postulates a causal chain-from wages or labor
costs to unemployment to monetary expansion
to inflation. If this were in fact the case, one
would still expect wages or labor costs to affect
monetary expansion, although at perhaps long
lags because ofthe two-step process. However,
we have seen that this is not the case. We also
tested this hypothesis directly by running caus-
ality tests between labor-cost variables and un-
employment, and between unemployment
rates and the money-supply indicators. Though
two-way causality or feedback was found be-
tween the labor-cost variables and unemploy-
ment rates, one-way causality from money-
supply growth to the unemployment rates was
generally found, with no sign of "accommo-
dation" of unemployment forthcoming. Thus,
the feedback between wages (or labor costs)
and unemployment is consistent with the ap-
parent one-way causal effects of money-supply
movements on all of these variables. Although
wages or labor costs are usually cited promi-
nently in cost-push analyses of inflation, our
analysis found no sign of systematic effects of
these variables on the "monetary environ-
ment," and so no compelling evidence for
these variables as causes ofsustained inflation.
Most of the tests for cost-push indicators
involved price indices vis-a-vis money-stock
variables, so that the percentage rate ofchange
ofeachofthe variables in a particularset could
be readily related in theoretical terms as well
as providing reasonably stationary time series.
That is, a change in the percentage rate of
growth of say, M-l could be expected to elicit
essentially the same percentage-point change
in, say, the CPI inflation rate, and vice versa-
no matter how high or low these rates were.
Thus, equations (1) and (2) could reasonably
be expected to be stable over time for these
56
variables, and could be expected to yield sta-
tistically meaningful results.
However, we should not expect the same for
various government spending or deficit varia-
bles..The government deficit, in its raw form,
is measured in dollars, and so should have an
increasing trend over time, both because of
inflation and economic growth. Therefore it
should be non-stationary. The percentage rate
of change of the deficit is not a reliable indi-
cator either, since a change from a $1 deficit
to a $2 deficit need not elicit the same money-
supply change as a shift from a $lO-billion to
a $20-billion deficit, and since any change from
a balanced budget indicates an infinite per-
centage change.
One alternative is to run the test between
the level of the deficit and the first difference
in the particular money-supply variable. This
equation form implies that a given dollar
amount of deficit requires a given dollar
amount of monetization by the Fed, and so a
given dollar amount of change in the money-
supply indicator. This form, although consist-
ent with government-deficit theories of infla-
tion, has poor statistical properties because
both of the variables are non-stationary. De-
spite these reservations, we ran causality tests
using this equation form, 12 and found signifi-
cant effects of the deficit on money growth,
with significant positive coefficients at the
shorter but not at the longer lags.
13 But again,
given the suspect nature of the variables, these
results must be interpreted carefully.
Another alternative would be to induce sta-
tionarity in the deficit series by dividing it by
another series with similar trend, such as nom-
inal GNP. Such a ratio does not have dollar
dimensions, and so will not be non-stationary
on this count. However, the resultant equation
form does not have clear theoretical validity-
thus, a one-point change in the deficit as a
percentage of nominal GNP need not gener-
ally elicit a fixed change in the money-supply
growth rate. When we performed causality
tests between the deficit/nominal GNP ratio
and various money-supply growth rates, we
found no significant effects in either direction.Table 2
Causality Results Between Various Economic Indicators and the Monetary Aggregates
Four Lags for all Variables, 1959.2-1979.2
M-1 M-2 St. louis Base Source Base
Consumer Prices f' LR' F' LR' F' LR' F' LR' f' LR2 f' LR2 f' LR' F' LR'
All Items 2,5" 1.9 1.7 0,2 1.3 L7 1.9 0,3 1.8 1.3 1.0 OJ 2,8" l.l 1.0 0,3
Food 3.6*** 1.8 1.3 0,1 l.8 1.3 1.0 0,1 2,0* 1.3 0.4 0,2 1.4 0,8 1.3 OJ
Excluding Food 1.6 1.6 1.3 0,3 1.9 1.5 1.2 0,3 3,3" 1.3 0,5 0,2 3,9" , 1.3 0,3 0.0
Wholesale Prices
All Items 2.7" 2.2 0.1 0.0 1.5 1.7 0.2 0.1 1.4 1.5 0.2 0.1 1.8 1.2 0.4 0.1
Non-farm 1.7 1.8 0.4 0.0 1.1 1.4 D.3 D.l 1.3 1.4 D.3 -0,1 1.5 1.2 0,3 -D,I
Farm 2,7" 2.2 D.2 O.D 1.2 1.4 0.5 0,0 1.5 1.5 0.2 O,D 1.2 0,9 1.0 0.2
Metals 2.D' 1.9 1.5 0,1 1.8 1.4 2.9" 0.1 3.9*** 1.4 1.3 0.1 2.5" 1.3 0,8 -0.2
Steel 1.6 L7 0,7 0.1 2,2' 1.3 1.8 D.I 2.1 ' 1.5 0,6 0.1 2.5" 1.5 1.0 -0.2
Fuel 1.4 1.8 0.1 O.D 0.9 1.0 0.5 D.I 1.5 2.4 O.S D.I 1.4 2.5 D.6 -0.1
Petroleum 1.2 1.3 D,8 0.1 D.4 0.1 1.4 D,I D,2 I.D D,6 D,I 1.3 2.2 0.4 -0.1
Wages for
Nonagricultural
WorkersJ 4.1 '** 0,5 0,3 0,3 3,7" D,2 0.3 D.D 6.2*** D,S 0,2 D.4 1.4 D.2 0,1 0,2
Manufacturing 1.6 0,9 D,9 D,S 3.6*** D,8 1.6 D.4 4.8*** 0,9 1.0 0.4 3,2" 0.7 1.2 D.2
Unit Labor Costs
Private Business 4.1 *** 1.5 0.4 D,2 2.D 1.0 0,8 D,3 2,2' 1.0 D.6 D,2 3.6*** D.9 0,3 -0,1
Manufacturing 2,3' 1.2 D,3 0,1 1.7 0.5 D,7 D,2 1.5 D,7 D,8 D,2 2,7" 0.9 0,7 -0.2
Non-farm 3.6*** 1.5 D,3 0.2 1.8 1.0 0,9 D,3 1.9 I.D D.8 D,3 2,9" I.D 0,7 -0,1
Unemployment Rates
All workers' 0.9 -0,9 0,5 0.1 1.4 1.4 1.2 0,2 0.4 -0,1 l.l 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1
Males 25-444 2,8" -0,8 0,3 -0.1 2.8** -1.2 2.0 D.D 0,5 -D.5 0.5 0,0 D.4 0,1 1.2 -0,1
Implicit Dellators
GNP 3.2" 1.3 1.0 D,3 1.8 I.D 1.4 0.4 3.1" 1.0 1.2 OJ 3.2" 0,9 3.3" 0.2
Personal
Consumption
Expenditures 2.7" 1.2 0.4 D.3 1.6 1.0 1.2 0.4 2,9" 1.0 D,S D,3 3,6" 0,3 0,7 0,0
Government 0.\ -2,7 1.9 0.\ 0,2 1.5 2.3' 0.2 0,9 12.4 1.0 D,D 2,5" 11.9 2.4' D,D
Deficit'
Deficit/ 1.2 -D,7 D,7 D,2 1.1 0,2 D,6 0,2 1.6 D,9 0,3 0,2 1.6 0.5 1.0 0,5
GNP Ratio'"
Government 0.2 D,O 0,6 D.2 0,2 D,3 2.7" 0.3 1.1 0,5 0.6 0,2 0,9 0.7 0.9 0,3
Spending'
'First column of each set shows F-statistic for effect of respective monetary aggregate on "cost" variable; second column shows long-run effect for this
relation; third column shows F-statistic for effect of "cost" variable on respective monetary aggregate; fourth column shows long-run effect for this
relation,
'Significant at 10 percent level.
"Significant at 5 percent level.
"'Significant at 1 percent level.
'F-Statistic for hypothesis that explanatory variable has no effect.
'Long-run effect of a permanent one-percentage-point change in explanatory variable on dependent variables; see Appendix I,
JSample period: 1966,2-1979,2.
'''Cost'' variable is in level form.
'Level of deficit vs, first difference of supply.
'Sample period: 1959:2-1978:4,
57One other alternative would be to consider
the percentage rate of change in government
debt, since the deficit presumably represents
the first difference in the debt. But there is no
reason why a stable relation should exist be-
tween the rates of change in debt and money
stock. Additionally, several measures of the
government debt, including on- and off-budget
items and various agency-debt issues, do not
provide first differences comparable to the def-
icit. We found no significant results when run-
ning tests using some of these variables.
Finally, we might consider government
spending as a cause of inflation and money
growth, since it represents the government's
actual drain of goods and services from the
economy-and since spending changes should
correspond to deficit changes, given the largely
inflexible (short-term) nature of the tax codes.
Also, the percentage rate ofchange of govern-
ment spending makes statistical sense and is
likely to be stationary. However, our tests in-
dicate that none ofthe money-supply variables
have significant effects on government expen-
ditures. Expenditures have a significant effect
on M-2, and also have a significant effect on
M-l when data for an earlier time period are
included. Even for these results, however, the
coefficients of expenditures at shorter lags are
negative, which would suggest that accelera-
tions in spending are initially followed by de-
celerations in money growth. Obviously this
finding is counter to what government spend-
ing-inflation theories normally suggest.
One might argue that our eight-quarter lag
structures are not conducive to measuring ac-
commodation effectively, that perhaps shorter
lags would be better for that purpose, since if
the Fed acts to accommodate inflationary dis-
turbances, it might do so quickly in order to
avoid near-term losses in output and employ-
ment. We tested this thesis by re-estimating
our Table 1 equations using four-quarter lag
structures (i.e., n = m r = s 4 in equa-
tions [1] and [2]), with the results shown in
Table 2.
However, there is even less evidence of ac-
commodation with these shorter lag structures.
The significant effects of the CPI on M-l and
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M-2 disappear, as do the effects of steel prices
on M-2. The only significant "feedback" onto
monetary indicators occurs for metals prices
on M-2, the GNP deflator on the source base,
and the deficit on M-2 and the source base. In
view of the isolated nature of these results,
and in view of the mitigating factors discussed
for similar results in Table 1, the feedback
shown in these three cases can probably be
dismissed as evidence of accommodation.
With our re-estimated equations, the signifl-
cance of the effects of money on prices and
wages also declines slightly, but the general
result is still that of one-way causality from
money to inflation indicators. There is certainly
nothing in these results that gives any stronger
signal of accommodation than the very weak
evidence found with longer lag structures. We
also obtained similar results with tests involv-
ing Almon polynomial-lag structures, and with
tests involving smaller sample periods (see
Appendix).
Conceivably we could keep dropping or add-
ing coefficients and re-estimating equations
until we found "significant" positive effects of
some inflation indicatoron some money-supply
indicator. But after mining the data in this
fashion, it would be impossible to determine
whether the significance of the results actually
lay in the data or in the prior beliefs of the
experimenter.
For the present results, we used general-
equation forms to minimize the amount of
prior information that might affect the results.
These tests were generally able to verify the
existence of a strong effect of monetary ex-
pansion on a wide range ofinflation indicators,
but found no reliable accommodative effects
of these indicators on the money-supply pro-
cess. Thus the evidence suggests that cost-push
factors do not provide a convincing explana-
tion of continuing inflation in recent U.S. his-
tory. Much the same could be said of govern-
ment-spending theories of inflation, although
our equation forms were not as well suited to
these types of theories as they were to cost-
push theories. Also, these indicators showed
more positive results, although their reliability
was suspect.m. Episodic Evidence on Inflation
Our tests found no reliable sign of system-
atic accommodation by the monetary authori-
tiesofcost-pushorsupply-side inflationary pres-
sures. It might be argued that the tests were
run over too long a time period to obtain
meaningful results-that thc Fed's "reaction
function" for these disturbances varies or
evolves over time, and/or that the Fed reacts
to different factors at different times, so that
a test involving one such factor over a twenty-
year period is doomed to failure. However,
these arguments for shifting, evanescent ef-
fects hamper the measurement of such phe-
nomena, and also diminish the usefulness of
the theory which they are intended to support.
If a theory is to be objectively testable and
useful for practical purposes, it must hold over
an extended period of time. To see this, recall
that in our tests, we estimateda common equa-
tion form, and avoided the temptation to "doc-
tor" the equations to improve the results. We
did this not because of an unshakable belief in
the equation form we used, but in order to
make the data speak directly to us and thus to
avoid making any subsequent changes that
would inevitably bring subjective judgment
into the final results.
By the same token, to argue that monetary
policy reacted to, say, wages in 1957-5R, and
then to use 1957-5R data to "verify" this ar-
gument, inevitably involves prior knowledge
of the data. This argument also effectively ig-
nores prior historical events (perhaps inflation-
ary money growth in 1955-56) that might bet-
ter explain 1957-58 developments. We would
be dealing with a sample of one period, i.e.
the 1957-5R period, which was drawn from the
whole set of historical data in a non-random
way. It is difficult to determine the reliability
of any such demonstration unless the evidence
holds over an extended period of time. Also,
tests over such a narrowly specified period
could provide evidence of an effect only for
that period. Knowing that money growth and
inflation, say, in 1957-58 were caused by wage
increases would not necessarily tell us anything
about the causes of inflation in other periods.
A verifiable, useful hypothesis about mon-
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etary accommodation and inflation therefore
should be supported by evidence of a system-
atic link between the particular variable and
the money supply over a period of time long
enough to allow statistical identification. Al-
though we were unable to find that type of
evidence in our earlier analysis, it is neverthe-
less interesting to examine the explanatory
power ofthe competing theories in certain spe-
cific periods.
Considerfirst the 1973-75 inflation. This burst
of inflation followed three possible causative
factors: the removal of mandatory wage and
price controls, largely completed by late 1973;
the oil crisis in late 1973, which resulted in a
quadrupling of crude oil prices; and a world-
wide acceleration in money-supply growth
starting in late 1970.
14 The removal of wage
and price controls could be expected to precip-
itate a temporary acceleration in inflation in
1973-74 to make up for the 1971-73 suppres-
sion of inflation, therefore transfering it to the
period immediately following the removal of
controls. The oil-price shock, on the other
hand, could have caused a temporary accel-
erationin inflation for reasonsdiscussed earlier.
In any event, monetary accommodation was
not evident in 1973-74, because money-supply
growth was decelerated sharply both before
and after these several developments (Figure
1) .15 The Federal Reserve apparently moved
to counter-rather than accommodate-infla-
tionary forces following the removal of con-
trols and the oil-price shock. Therefore, on the
basis of our earlier analysis, none of these fac-
tors could be regarded as sources ofcontinuing
inflation even in this subperiod.
This leaves the question: how important are
these factors as causes of transitory inflation
over the period at hand? We can address this
question by determininghow much inflation can
be explained by monetary forces alone, attrib-
uting any remaining inflation to the non-mone-
tary factors mentioned. Because the existence
ofcontrols probably shifted monetary inflation
to the post-controls period, the simulations
were performed starting in third-quarter 1971,
the date of imposition of the controls. Becausethe suppressed inflation presumably took two
years to work through the economy, the sim-
ulation period was terminated in fourth-




(1) was simulated over 1971.3-1975.4 for four
general measures of inflation (CPI, WPI, GNP
deflator, and GNP deflator for personal con-
sumption goods) and for the four basic money-
supply measures.
17 Because the results could
be biased by using an equation form estimated
from a sample period including 1971.3-1975.4,
we performed simulations for equations esti-
mated from two other sample periods: 1959.2-
1971.2, designated the "short" sample period,
and 1959.2-1971.2 /1976.1-1979.2, designated
the "bracketed" sample.
As would be expected, the simulations
yielded generally positive "forecast" errors
over the early part of the period, when con-
trols should have suppressedinflation below the
level implied by previous money-supply
growth, and generally negative "forecast"er-
rors over the latter period, when the renlOval
ofcontrols should have pushed inflation above
levels predicted by previous money-supply
growth. Yet the monetary aggregates do a
Chart 1
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60fairly good job of explaining cumulative infla-
tion over the entire period (Table 3). M-1
growth can explain all but 6 percentage points
of the 37.9-percent cumulative increase in the
CPI in the short-sample simulation, and ac-
tually overpredicts inflation in the other simu-
lations. Similarresults holdfor the deflatorsim-
ulations. In contrast, simulation errors are
larger by as much as 31 percentage points for
the 56.2-percent cumulative increase in the
WPI. The disparity can be explained in part
by the fact that the WPI involves goods at all
stages of the production process, and so prob-
ably over-counts the effects of an increase in
the price of a factor (like oil) which is promi-
nently used in a number of products. Also, as
our earlier analysis suggests, a supply shock
should primarily affect relative prices. In the
case of the oil shock, one would expect the
relative returns to other productive factors,
such as labor and capital, to fall relative to
that for energy. This would then increase the
level of wholesale prices relative to consumer
(retail) prices, since the latter has a higher
service and labor content, while the former is
more sensitive to fuels and primary products.
In any case, previous movements in money-
supply growth (along with the transferring ef-
fects of controls) are able to explain most of
the 1973-75 inflation, with the divergent move-
ments between the WPI and the other mea-
sures apparently due to higher relative prices
for oil and energy inputs. These results, and
the apparent lack ofmonetary accommodation
ofvarious price shocks, suggest that this period
was not demonstrably different from other pe-
riods in terms of the interrelation between
monetary policy and inflation.
In similar fashion to the earlierdebate, some
analysts today describe the 1978-80 inflation as
being a new strain of the inflationary "virus,"
contracted from different "germs," and so
somehow immune to traditional anti-inflation
policy prescriptions. They tend to blame the
currentinflationonlargefood-price increasesin
early 1978, and oil-price increases in 1979,
spread through the economy by workers seek-
ing to index their wages to the cost of living.
Some argue that this widespread trend to in-
dexing makes inflation more immune to restric-
tive monetary policy. Still, the arguments pro-
pounded today resemble those made in 1973-
75, although perhaps on a smaller scale.
We can gain some insight into the nature of
Table 3



































29.2 (5.9) 33.8 (2.3)
19.3 (31.0) 24.4 (25.5)
38.2 (1.6) 56.1 ( 14.8)
26.6 (6.1) 34.3 (0.1)
Bracketed Sample
38.8 (1.4) 41.8 (-3.6)
34.5 (16.1) 37.4 (13.7)
33.8 (1.6) 39.6 ( 2.7)
32.4 (1.5) 40.8 (-4.8)
long Sample
38.5 (- 1.2) 37.4 (-0.4)
44.8 (7.9) 43.6 (8.8)
35.6 (0.3) 34.8 (0.8)



























27.7 ( 5.2)this inflation by analyzing it in terms of the
money-price relationsdeveloped earlier. Money-
supply growth startedtoaccelerate in late 1975
or early 1976, following two years of declining
growth rates. (Figure 1). This development
would suggest an acceleration in inflation start-
ing in late 1976 or early 1977, and becoming
very strong by about early 1978, as actually
occurred. However, there were no signs of an
acceleration in labor costs, nor any identifiable
supply shocks, at the time of the monetary
acceleration. It seems unlikely, then, that the
monetary acceleration of 1976-77 was gener-
ated by accommodative Federal Reserve be-
havior, at least attributable to cost-push pres-
sures.
To measure these factors more precisely, we
again simulated the inflation-money supply
equations for various indicators. To avoid bias-
ing the results, we again re-estimated the equa-
tions over sample periods not including the
respective simulation period. Thus, the equa-
tions were estimated over the 1959.2-1977.4
period, and simulated over 1978.1-1981.4 (first
simulation), then estimated over 1959.2-1978.4
and simulated over 1979.1-1981.4 (second sim-
ulation), and finally estimated over 1959.2-
1979.4 and simulated over 1980.1-1981.4.
IH
Despite the correct "phasing" evidenced in
recent years between money growth and infla-
tion, significant amountsofinflation clearly ap-
peared to· be outside•the explanation of pre-
vious money-supply <growth (Table 4). For
example, CPI inflation was two percentage
points higher in .1978 and four percentage
points higher in 1979 than would be suggested
by conditionalforecasts ba.sedon·M-l.growth.19
Theseresults wouldseemto reflect the impact
of the 1978 food-price shock and the 1979 oil-
price shock. Even so, the first simulation re-
sults are still able to explain a large part ofthe
recent inflation acceleration.
To the extentthatlarge, recognizable.shocks
to food and oil prices explain the rest, this
argument is consistent with the previous anal-
ysis, where such shocks were said to have pos-
sibly permanent effects on the price level (in-
dependently of the money supply) and so
temporary effects on the inflation rate. How-
ever, this can be true only to the extent that
the simulation errors evidenced in Table 4 rep-
resent the effects of unforseeable shocks. If
these errors could be attributed instead to the
systematic effects of factors predictable on
non-monetary grounds, the power of the
money-price relation might be diminished. To
analyze such questions, we should consider
what forecasters were predicting about 1978-
79 inflation in 1977-78. These analysts, espe-
cially those employing large econometric
Table 4
Simulations of M-1 Inflation Equation (1978-81)




























































'This rate is the December over previous December increase.
621978-79, accounting for an acceleration in the
underlying rate of inflation to the 8-to-1O per-
cent range.
Theremaining CPI inflation in 1979 is clearly
due to the short-term effects of large oil-price
increases, given the larger errors experienced
by forecasters using more structural informa-
tion-and given the lack of large simulation
errors for the GNP deflator, which does not
directly include import prices, and thus fails to
reflect the full impact of OPEC price actions.
Such a random shock to prices can temporarily
pull measured inflation rates away from rates
predicted by the money supply. However, the
expansion in money-supply growth and the ac-
celeration in inflation clearly occurred well be-
fore oil prices surged, so that the recent infla-
tion could not be attributed to monetary
accommodation of oil-price increases.
In summary, the 1973-75 and 1978-79 epi-
sodes ofinflation did not show any greater sign
of accommodation than did the 1959-79 period
as a whole. In each case, the acceleration in
inflation was preceded by an acceleration in
money-supply growth. The money-supply be-
havior then was able to explain a predominant
portion of actual measured inflation, with the
remaining part clearly attributable to the tem-
porary effects ofoil- and food-price shocks. As
for 1980, the money-price relation suggests
that inflation, though declining, will remain
quite high through the year, even if M-1 grows
no faster than the 5-percent rate assumed in
the simulations.
models, presumably utilized a wide range of
available information in their forecasts. If our
simulations compare favorably to their fore-
casts, it would suggest that recent "nonmone-
tary" inflation was in fact due to large unfor-
seeable shocks to oil and food prices rather
than to systematic defects in the money-price
relation.
20
As it turns out, most analysts experienced
forecast errors larger-and in some cases much
larger- than the errors for the money-price
simulations shown in Table 4. Most late-I978
forecasts showed inflation slowing to below 8
percent in 1979. The simulations-using
money-supply information through 1979 but
price information through only 1977 or 1978-
showed inflation remaining steady or even ac-
celerating in 1979. Despite underpredicting
1979 CPI inflation by four percentage points,
the simulation predictions were certainly more
accurate than those of the major forecasters.
This does not necessarily mean that the
money-price equation is a superior forecasting
tool, because the simulations utilized infor-
mation not available to the forecasters: actual-
money-supply growth over the respective sim-
ulation periods.21 However, it does suggest
three important points: a) actual money-sup-
ply growth is indeed helpful for predicting in-
flation in the presentperiod; b) the large errors,
apparent in both the simulations and outside
forecasts, represent the effects of random, un-
predictable shocks, rather than systematic de-
fects in the money-price relation; and c) M-l
does a creditable job of explaining inflation in
IV. Summary and Conclusions
In this article, we have examined the direc- tion in the last twenty years. Furthermore,
tion of Granger (econometric) causality be- even in two recent episodes of inflation accel-
tween the U.S. money supply-as measured eration, the behavior of the money-supply
by four prominent monetary aggregates-and measures alone was capable of explaining
a number of variables considered representa- these experiences reasonably well, with little
tive of cost-push and government-deficit infla- evidence of accommodation. Though some
tionary pressures. We found widespread and signs of systematic effects of government-
significant "causal" effects from the money- spending variables on the money supply ex-
supply measures to the price or cost variables, isted, these effects were not particularly con-
but found no reverse effects, at least not of a vincing.
nature that would suggest monetary-accom- These result!i therefore fail to support the
modation. Thus, we found little if any evidence commonly-held theory of a wage-price spiral:
of the systematic existence of cost-push infla- the idea that increasing labor costs cause in-creasing prices, which cause workers to seek
still higher wages, with the process continuing
indefinitely on its own momentum. Such a
"perpetualmotioninflation machine" couldnot
not continue on its own without continuous
"refueling" in the form of an accommodative
monetary policy. Yet, there is no convincing
evidence that the Federal Reserve has con-
ducted monetary policy in such an accommo-
dative manner. Rather, the increases in the
money supply have more typically acted as an
underlying cause of the increases in wages and
prices. More than providing the fuel to keep
the engine running, an increasing money sup-
ply has apparently provided the initial spark
igniting the engine.
Some might contend that at root the various
theoriesofinflation all say much thesamething.
Cost-push theorists might see income-share
struggles as first affecting wages and prices,
and thence forcing accommodation by mone-
tary authorities who seek to avoid disruptions
to output and employment. At the same time,
monetary theorists might emphasize govern-
ment efforts to achieve unattainable economic
goals (or to avoid painful explicit tax increases)
in order to appease impatient electorates,
thereby leading to autonomous monetary ex-
pansion and thenceinflation. At this level, both
sides ultimately seem to blame inflation on so-
cio-political pressures, and disagree mainly
about the mechanisms which transmit these
pressures.
Yet, it can be argued that the two ap-
proaches actually give rise to quite different
insights and policy implications. If nothing
else, the monetary approach emphasizes the
importance of the money supply in continuing
the inflation process, whereas this role is often
left implicit in the cost-push formulation. More
importantly, identifying the actual channels
through which inflationary forces operate sug-
gests different policy strategies for slowing in-
flation. It is true that if socio-political struggles
underlie any inflation, then any effective anti-
inflation policy must educate the public about
the futility of attempting to resolve struggles
in this way, and must devise political reforms
to keep these struggles from being translated
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into inflation. Butitis also true that ifcost-push
channels cannot be identified as crucial in the
transmission of these struggles to inflation, as
we suggest, then policy reforms should start
with channels that can be identified. Thus, re-
form should possibly begin with the operations
of monetary policy and related policy influ-
ences. from the executive and legislative
branches-rather than with income policies
designed to control industrial sectors which
have typically reacted to rather than instigated
inflationary pressures. Of course alternative
channels ofinflationary pressures operating on
the money supply (such as government spend-
ing or "finetuning" tendencies) may be just as
hard to identify as cost-push pressures are.
Indeed, our study suggests that while we can
easily identify money-supply expansion as a
cause ofinflation, we cannoteasily explain why
the money supply grows. Neither major set of
theories--cost-push or government-spending-
provides convincing evidence on this point.
Fluctuations in interest rates (actually, credit
market conditions) may be able to explain
money-supply growth in relation to former
(pre-October 1979) Federal Reserve operating
procedures, but a definitive answer to this is-
sue awaits further research.
In closing, we may note a few other impli-
cations of our results. First, the two monetary
base measures exerted significant effects on
many of the cost variables, and in some cases
actually outperformed the broader money-
stock measures. This suggests that monetary·
base information can be useful in judging the
inflationary impact of monetary factors when
financial innovations (e.g., automatic trans·
fers) blur the meaningfulness of the money·
stock data. Thus, monetary policymaking need
not be totally at a loss in times of financial
innovation. Also, M-1 generally outperformed
the.broader M-2 measure, both in terms of the
statistical reliability ofits effect on various cost
variables and in terms of its independence of
such variables. This observation will not re-
solve the long-standing M·l vs. M-2 contro-
versy, but it should provide a useful piece of
evidence on that subject.REFERENCES
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Alternative Estimation Forms
This Appendix discusses the results of esti-
mations of alternative equation forms for
equations (1) and (2), for the variables listed
in Table 2. Once again, Table 2 showed the
results of estimating the equations:
where a, b, and c are the coefficients of the
polynomial. This specification would necessi-
tate estimation of only three parameters, a, b,
and c, rather than eight, 1'1' ... ,1'w Also, the
technique for estimating this equation would
use three variables, Sit ' Sz, ' and S3' which are
linear combinations of X'_I' ... , x,_s' and al-
legedly the multicollinearity among these three
variables would be less of a problem than that
among the eight lagged values of X, .
Without speculating on the validity of this
technique, the equations summarized in Table
2 were re-estimated, first under a specification
ofsecond-degree PDL for all lag sets, and then
under a specification of third-degree PDL for
all sets. No further constraints were imposed
on the lag structure. The results of these esti-
mations are shown in Tables A-I and A-2 re-
spectively. Also, by comparing the results of
the PDL with that of the OLS estimation of
the same equation, the suitability of the POL
specification can be tested. An F-test can be
derived, a significant value of which would in-
dicate that the data are inconsistent with the
POL specification. These F-statistics are
shown in Tables A.I and A.2, along with the
F-statistics for the hypothesis that the explan-
atory variable does not "cause" the dependent
variable.
For example, consider the first set of results
in Table A.I. The first F-statistic of 6.2 indi-
cates that the effect of M-Ion the CPI is sig-
nificant at the I-percent level. The 0.8 "POL"
F-statistic (not significant) indicates that the
second degree POL assumptions for this
regression are not inconsistent with the data.
The 0.3 F-statistic shows that the effect of the
CPI on M-I is statistically insignificant. The
3.9 "PDL" F-statistic indicates that the POL
assumption for this regression is inconsistent
with the data, i.e. that the equation regressing
M-I growth on lagged M-I growth and CPI
inflation has coefficients which do not obey a
second-degree polynominal specification.
The results ofTables A.I and A.2 are clearly
similar to those of Tables' 1 and 2. While the
F-statistics suggest that POL assumptions are
generally inappropriate for regressions using
money-supply growth-especially M-l growth-
as the dependent variable, this generally mir-
rors the inappropriateness of the POL for the
time-series behavior of the money supply it-
self. Generally, the feedback effects on infla-
tion indicators themselves on the money sup-
ply are too weak or non-existent to be
materially distorted by POL assumptions.
Finally, Niskanen (1978) has referred to an
obvious change in the conduct of monetary
policy starting in the late 1960's. If policy re-
(1)
j = 1, ... , 8
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ex + L[3y,_j + L1'j X,_j + Elt ,
1 1




1'j = af + bj + c,
(2)
The estimations of the equations (1) and (2),
as documented so far, were done through or-
dinary least-squares estimation (OLS), with no
constraints imposed on the structure of the lag
coefficients, other than the lag-length assump-
tion.
While this technique is common in time-se-
ries analyses and causality studies, the reader
may object to the existence of multicollinearity
among the regressor variables, because of the
number of lagged regressors involved. A tech-
nique designed to minimize this multicolli-
nearity and preserve degrees of freedom in
estimation is that of polynomial distributed
lags (PDL). This technique assumes that the
coefficients of a given distributed lag are re-
lated to each other through a polynomial func-
tion. For example, in equation (1), for the lag
set 1'10 ..., 1's, a second-degree PDL specifica-
tion would assert that
y,
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Causality Tests Using an Unconstrained Second Degree
Polynomial Lag Structure (Eight Quarters Long) for All Variables·
M-l M-2 St. Louis Base Source Base
Consumer Prices F' F-PDl' F' F·PDl' F' F-PDl' F' F·PDl' F' F-PDl' F' F-PDl' F' F-PDl' F' F-PD[
All Items 6.2*** 0.8 0.3 3.9*"'* 4.2*** 0.7 0.9 3.0** 3.1** 0.7 0.2 1.2 2.8** 1.1 0.3 1.6
Food 5.9*** 0.7 004 2.9*** 4.1 "'*'" 0.8 0.3 2.6** 2.9** 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.4 1.2
Excluding Food 4.6*** 0.7 1.0 4.2*** 2.3* 0.9 1.4 2.1 ** 1.9 1.5 0.3 0.7 5.5*** 0.8 0.6 1.2
Wholesale Prices
All Items 5.8*** 0.8 0.2 1.9* 4.5*** 0.7 0.7 1.7 3.0** 0.3 0.1 0.7 1.3 1.6 0.5 1.2
Non-Farm 6.2*** 1.2 0.1 2.2** 5.4*** 1.2 0.7 2.2** 2.6* 104 0.3 0.8 2.5* 3.3*** 0.5 1.1
Farm 4.1*** 1.2 004 1.8* 3.1 ** 0.8 0.8 1.7* 1.7 1.1 0.5 0.7 1.4 1.5 1.1 0.9
Metals 4.7*** 2.0** 0.3 2.3** 4.1 *** 104 0.9 3.0*** 2.8** 2.1 ** 0.5 1.8* 2.8* 2.6*** 0.9 1.0
Steel 3.6** 1.5 0.1 10*** 2.3* 1.7 0.7 3.5*** 2.5* 2.1 ** 0.2 1.2 2.7** 2.5** 1.1 0.8
Fuel 5.0*** 104 0.2 2.1 ** 3.0** [A 0.9 1.7 2.7** 1.8* 0.2 1.0 2.9** 1.5 0.3 1.3
Petroleum 4.9*** 2.7*** 0.5 2.0** 1.3 3.0*** 1.3 1.6 1.1 3.0*** 0.2 0.8 1.5 3.2*** 0.3 1.1
Wages For
Nonagricultural
Workers' 2.4* 2.0* 0.7 0.9 1.3 2.2** 0.1 0.8 1.9 3.2*** 0.5 0.9 6.0*** 1.9* 0.9 1.2
Manufacturing 3.1 ** 0.8 0.6 2.0* 3.7** 104 0.6 1.9* 4.3*** 204** 004 1.2 5.7*** 1.9* 0.2 104
Unit Labor Costs
Private Business 6.6*** 0.6 0.7 0.6 3.2** 0.7 l.l [A 3.5** 0.5 0.8 1.6 4.4*** 0.9 0.3 0.6
Manufacturing 4.5*** 104 0.3 004 3.5** 1.5 004 1.5 2.2* 1.7* 0.6 1.8* 2.6* 2.1 ** 0.3 0.9
Non-Farm 6.6*** 0.7 0.5 0.4 3.3** 0.7 1.0 1.3 3.8** 0.7 0.8 1.7* 3.9** 0.8 0.3 0.6
Unemployment Rates
All Workers' 6.4*** 9.2*** 1.2 0.3 3.7** 7.8*** 1.8 104 2.1 8.9*** 1.6 2.3** 1.5 8.1 *** 0.1 0.8
Males 25-44' 4.4*** 6.0*** 0.7 0.3 304** 4.9*** 1.6 1.6 1.6 5.3*** 1.0 1.6* 1.0 3.6*** 004 1.1
Implicit Deflators
GNP 4.5*** 1.3 1.6 0.6 2.7* 1.1 1.7 104 4.7*** 0.9 0.8 1.8* 2.9** 0.5 0.8 1.9*
Personal
Consumption
Expenditures 5.6*** 0.6 0.5 0.8 4.3*** 1.2 1.1 1.7* 3.8** 0.7 0.2 1.8* 3.9** 1.0 1.1 0.9
Government Deficit' 1.2 2.9* '" '" 3.5** 1.3 0.9 1.9* 3.1** 1.8* 1.6 1.8* 1.6 104 4.0** 2.0** 2.1 * 1.8*
Deficit/GNP Ratio' 1.4 1.8* 0.9 1.3 0.1 2.6** 0.5 104 0.9 1.8* 0.5 0.8 1.3 2.1 ** 0.3 1.5*
Government
Spending 1.0 2.6*** 0.1 2.2** 004 2.5** 0.3 3.2*** 0.7 2.9* '" '" 0.1 1.0 1.2 2.8*** 0.7 1.3
'The first column in each set shows the F-statistic for the effect of the respective monetary aggregate on the "cost" variable; second column shows thl
F-statistic for the hypothesis that a second degree PDL fits this relation; third column shows the F-statistic for the effect of the "cost" variable on tht
monetary aggregate; fourth column shows the F·statistic for the PDL for this relation.
'Significant at 10% level.
"Significant at 5% level.
"'Significant at 1% level.
IF-statistic tests the hypothesis that the explanatory variable has no effect on the dependent variables. 'F-statistic tests the hypothesis that the PDt
constraint is consistent with the data. 'Sample period: 1966.2-1979.2. '''Cost'' variables are in level form. sThis result is between the deficit and fi",
difference in the respective monetary aggregate.
67action did indeed shift starting in the late
1960's, one might expect the causality results
between the money supply and various cost
indicators to be different in the last ten years
than in the previous ten. As a first attempt to
allow for such changes,somepf the results in
Table 2 were re-run with a sample period con-
sisting of 1969.2-1979.2, and a third degree
PDLspecification imposed to preserve degrees
of freedom. Also, some of the results were re-
run overthe 1959.2-1979.2 period in OLS form
with a dummy variable for the last ten years,
in an attempt to pick up obvious shifts in the
money-supply accommodation equations. These
estimations did not show any substantive
changes in the causality results, nor were any
signs of a shift in policy behavior apparent.
Table A.2
Causality Tests Using an Unconstrained Third Degree Polynomial Lag Structure
(Eight Quarters Long) for all Variables·
M·l M·2 St. Louis Base Source Base
Consumer Prices F' F-PDL' F' F-PDL' F' F-PDL' F' F-PDL' F' F-PDL' F' F-PDL' F' F-PDL' F' F-PDL
All Items 5.0*** 0.8 0.2 4.5*** 3.3** 0.8 0.7 3.7*** 2.6'* 0.8 0.4 1.2 2.2* 1.4 0.7 1.3
Food 4.9*** 0.6 1.1 2.8** 3.8*** 0.6 0.3 3.1 *** 3.1'* 0.7 1.2 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.1 l.l
Excluding Food 3.3" 0.8 2.0' 4.1 *** 1.8 1.0 2.8'* 1.7 1.6 1.6 0.3 0.7 4.0'*' 0.9 1.1 0.8
Wholesale Prices
All Items 5.0'" 0.7 0.2 2.1' 3.8*** 0.7 1.3 1.7 2.1 ' 0.3 0.2 0.7 1.6 1.6 0.5 1.0
Non-Farm 3.8**'" 1.0 0.4 2.3" 3.3'* 1.0 1.8 2.1 * 2.2' 0.8 0.2 0.8 4.1 *** 1.9* 0.6 0.9
Farm 3.9*** 1.0 0.3 2.0' 2.6'* 0.8 0.2 2.1 ' 1.6 1.1 0.6 0.5 1.1 1.7 1.0 0.7
Metais 3.8"* 1.6 0.5 2.3" 2.5** 1.2 2.2* 2.8*' 3.1** 1.4 0.5 2.1 ** 4.0**' 1.5 0.9 0.8
Steel 3.0" 0.6 0.5 3.1 *** 1.7 1.0 1.2 3.8*** 2.8*' 0.9 0.7 1.3 3.9*** 0.9 0.8 0.7
Fuel 3.8*** I.I 0.2 2.3" 2.0 1.2 1.0 1.9* 2.0 1.6 0.7 0.8 3.0** 0.9 0.3 1.3
Petroleum 4.0*** 2.8" 1.7 1.5 1.0 3.3** '" 1.9 15 1.4 3.0*** 0.2 0.8 II 3.6*** 0.4 0.9
Wages For
Nonagricultural
Workers' 1.8 2.3" 0.5 10 1.1 2.7'* 0.2 0.8 19 3.6*** 1.0 0.9 5.0'" 2.1 * 1.0 0.9
Manufacturing 2.2* 1.0 0.7 2.0* 2.6'* 1.8 0.5 2.3** 3.5'* 2.8*** 0.3 1.3 4.1*** 2.4'* 0.8 1.1
Unit Labor Costs
Private Business 5.6*** 0.2 0.6 0.6 3.3*' 0.3 1.1 1.0 2.7" 0.3 0.6 1.8 3.4** 0.8 0.2 0.5
Manufacturing 3.5" 1.6 0.4 0.3 2.8" 1.7 05 l.l 2.0 1.9 0.4 2.1" 2.0 2.5** 0.9 0.6
Non-farm 5.3*** 0.4 0.5 0.2 3.2'* 0.4 1.0 07 3.5** 0.4 0.7 1.6 1.5*' 0.5 0.2 0.5
Unemployment Rates
All Workers' 4.9*** 3.6*** l.l 0.2 2.2' 3.1*** 1.7 0.9 1.4 3.7** '" 1.3 2.7*' 0.2 3.6*** 0.3 0.7
Males 25-44' 3.7*** 3.1 *** 0.7 0.1 2.4* 2.4** 1.6 1.1 1.8 2.3** 0.9 1.8 0.5 1.2 0.4 1.0
Implicit Deflators
GNP 3.8*** 14 1.3 0.5 2.5" II 1.5 10 3.6*** 10 0.5 2.2" 2.7' 0.5 0.5 2.2**
Personal
Consumption
Expenditures 4.2*** 0.6 0.4 0.9 3.0" 1.4 08 1.4 2.8** 0.7 0.3 2.1., 3.4'* 0.9 0.7 10
Government
Deficit' 0.7 2.6" 2.7" 15 0.7 1.4 2.4' 2.0' 1.4 1.2 1.8 1.4 2.8** 1.6 2.9'*1.2
Deficit/GNP
Rati04 0.9 2.3" 0.7 1.3 0.1 3.2*** 08 15 0.7 2.2'* 0.9 06 1.3 2.4** 1.5 0.9
Government
110 Spending 0.8 2.1** 0.3 2.3** 0.3 2.1 ** 1.2 3.3*** 06 2.4'* 0.7 0.8 2.3'* 0.4 1.2
'First column in each set shows the F-statistic for the effect of the respective monetary aggregate on the "cost" variable; second column shows the F-
statistic for the hypothesis that a third degree PDL fits this relation; third column shows the F-statistic for the effect of the "cost" variable on the
monetary aggregate; fourth column shows the F-statistic for the PDL for this relation.
'Significant at 10 percent level.
"Significant at 5 percent level.
..'Significant at 1 percent level.
'F-statistic tests the hypothesis that the explanatory variable has no effect on the dependent variables.
'F-statistic tests the hypothesis that the PDL constraint is consistent with the data.
'Sample period: 1966.2-1979.2.
'''Cost'' variables are in level form.
'This result is between the deficit and first difference in the respective monetary aggregate.
68FOOTNOTES
1. Johnson's (1971) is the best known use of this phrase.
Earlier users are cited by him as well.
2. This is obviously a very capsule treatment of the neu-
trality-of-money hypothesis. Among other things, it implicitly
assumes 1) that economic actors do not have "money illu-
sion," and so will not feel better (worse) off if nominal wealth
and all money prices increase (decrease) by an equal pro-
portion; 2) that government bonds do not represent net
wealth to the private sector (that is, the interest payments
forthcoming from them are offset by future tax revenues
needed to service the debt-see Barro (1974) for a discus-
sion of this, and Metzler (1951) for a model where the net
wealth status of bonds prevents neutrality); and 3) that the
distribution of wealth in an economy is not irretrievably al-
tered by the process of convergence to equilibrium following
an increase in the money supply. See Patinkin (1963), Fried-
man (1956), or Barro and Grossman (1976) for extended
treatments of these issues.
The neutrality hypothesis does not rule out grow1h in output
or employment over time, but only specifies that these will
eventually be unaffected by the level of the money supply.
Nordoes neutrality imply that real variables are independent
of the rate of change of the money supply, this latter con-
cept being commonly known as "super neutrality."
The reader should note that these neutrality concepts, while
convenient for showing the effects of money on prices, are
not necessary conditions for the inflationary effects of an
increase in the money supply.
3. This point is discussed in Jacobs et al. (1978).
4. Monetary discussions of inflation state that sustained
changes in the rate of money-supply growth, relative to
previous trends, will lead to changes in the trend rates of
change in prices and wages. This description allows for the
possibility that a positive rate of money-supply growth (usu-
ally estimated at about 1% per year for M-1 in the U.S.) will
allow a zero inflation rate. Even in this case, it is still true
that sustained changes in money grow1h above this rate will
lead to sustained inflation.
5. Because lagged dependent variables are included in
equations (1) and (2), the eight-quarter lag structure does
not constrain the total lag from the explanatory to inde-
pendent variables to be eight quarters or less. That is, in
(1), Ytdepends on Yt.l,..., Yt.B, but since YI·Bdepends on Xt·1B,
Ytwill then indirectly depend on xl.1B, and avery long lag can
be estimated by the equation form described in the text.
6. Deterministic seasonality refers to the perfectly predict-
able seasonal variation in a variable, while stochastic sea-
sonality refers to seasonal fluctuation that varies randomly,
perhaps in correlation with other seasonal variables. For
example, suppose M-1 's growth rate was on average 6
percentage points higher in the fourth quarter, due to Christ-
mas financing needs, than in the first quarter. Then M-1
would have a deterministic seasonal component of 6 per-
cent in the fourth quarter relative to the first. However,
fluctuations in this seasonal difference would still exist due
to random seasonal factors, and these would represent
stochastic seasonality.
Deterministic seasonality can be handled by extracting sea-
sonal means from the data, which is what seasonal dum-
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mies do in the regressions done here. Stochastic season-
ality must be handled in other ways, such as through the
fourth- and eighth-order autoregressive coefficients in the
equations in the text.
Plosser (1975) provides a more complete discussion of
these issues. Also, Sargent (1976) discusses how the use
of seasonal filters to "pre-whiten" data can distort the results
in Granger causality tests.
7. Also, the quarterly level observations used are end-of-
period observations for the quarter rather than quarterly
averages. Computing rates of change for averaged data
can be shown to introduce spurious effects, and so this
practice was avoided.
8. That is, the levels of the variables used here generally
have increasing time trends, and so are very likely nonsta-
tionary. Therefore, percent changes were computed to at-
tempt to induce stationarity. While inflation rates would also
seem to have shown some trend over the last twenty years,
these are, in any case, clearly more stationary than price
levels. For the equations summarized in Table 1, the sum
of the coefficients for the lagged dependent variable, while
large, were uniformly below 1, in the .5-.7 range, suggesting
that the implicit stationarity assumptions behind these equa-
tions hold at least approximately.
9. The St. Louis base is adjusted for shifts in deposits
between large (high reserve requirement) banks and small
(low reserve requirement) banks, as well as for shifts in
general reserve requirements, in order to capture the "de-
posit-creating" power of a given stock of currency and re-
serves. For a detailed explanation of this series, see An-
derson and Jordan (1968).
10. Using the variables in equation (1), if x were held at a
stationary value x, y would approach the stationary value y,
where
y a + ~f3iY + ~'Yix, so that
y = a/(1
Therefore, in the long-run, y responds to sustained changes
in x by a factor of ~'Yi/(1 - ~f3j), which is how the long-run
effects in Table 1 are computed.
It is important to keep in mind that the significance of the F-
statistic does not necessarily say anything about the signif-
icance of the long-run effects also shown in Table 1 (and in
Table 2 below). This is because the F-statistic is for the
hypothesis that the whole vector bl,"" 'YB) in (1) (or
(f.Lj,..•, f.LB) in (2)) is equal to a zero vector, while a test of
the long-run effect would concern whether ~'Yj in (1) (or ~
f.Lj in (2) was equal to zero. Thus it could well be that the 'Y-
vector differs significantly from zero, but that the individual
coefficients vary in sign so that their sum is negligibly dif-
ferent from zero. Indeed, this is the case for the regressions
of M-1- and M-2-growth rates on CPI inflation, as discussed
in the text.
On the other hand, it should be clear that if the 'Y-vector (f.L-
vector) is not significantly different from zero, the sum of its
coefficients cannot be significantly different from zero.
Therefore, significance of the F-statistic is a necessary but
not a sufficient condition for the significance of the long-run
effect.Tests of the significance of the long-run effect could be
conducted by running another regression in which the long-
run effect was constrained to zero, for (1) by imposing the
linear constraint ~'Yj = 0 on the data-justas the significance
of the "I-vector was tested by running another regression
with the 8 linear constraints 'Yj = 0, j = 1,...,8 imposed on the
equation, I.e. by dropping the Xt.j regressions from '(1). These
tests of the long-run effects were not conducted in order to
economize on computer time, especially in view of the gen-
eral lack of significant F-statistics for the accommodation
equations initially.
11. This argument was attributed to Haberler by Milton
Friedman.
12. Since the deficit and first difference in the money-sup-
ply series already have a decided trend, the seasonal
means of. these variables also have a trend over time, so
that seasonal dummies would be expected to do a poor job
of removing even deterministic seasonality from the data.
Therefore, seasonally adjusted data were used for this test,
further clouding the meaningfulness of its results.
13. The long-run effects can be easily cOl.lputed from the
estimated equations. However, computing the significance
of differences in these long-run coefficients from zero or
unity, involves estimating another equation (one in which
the long-run effect is constrained to zero or one) and then
comparing the two equations. Since a substantial number
of equations had already been run in compiling Table 1,
tests of the significance of the long-run effects were not
generally conducted.
14. Gordon (1977) presents an interesting discussion of
these and other effects, and the various theories citing
them.
15. In considering these issues, Bazdarich (1978) found
that money-supply growth was actually significantly lower
in a number of Pacific Basin countries (including the U.S.)
than would be expected given inflation and previous money
growth. This also suggests a lack of accommodation in this
period.
16. A similar calculation was performed by Friedman in an
exchange between him and Modigliani (see Friedman and
Modigliani (1977)), with much the same results.
In a subsequent part of that discussion, Modigliani claims
that the Nixon Administration price controls "had no effect
whatever on wages ... (and) a small effect on prices, and
that it washed out fairly quickly." Yet the simulations dis-
cussed in the text showed a run of positive simulation errors
(over forecasts of inflation) during the controls period, and a
run of negative errors immediately following the controls
period. For example, the "bracketed sample" M-1 - CPI
simulation from 1971.3-1972.4 showed six straight positive
simulation errors generally larger than 2 percentage points
on an annualized basis, and summing to 4 percent over
"forecast" of the price level over the controls period. In
1973, when the controls were being phased out, two small
overforecasts were followed by one small underforecast.
Then, through 1974.4, five straight sizable under-forecasts
were found, with a cumulative underforecast inflation in the
post-controls period of 3.3%. This provides at least impres-
sionisticevidence that the controls transferred price in-
creases across periods.
Finally, even without any allowance for the possible delaying
effectof controlson inflation, this simulation predicted a 9.2%
]0
CPI inflation rate in 1974-somewhat below the actual re-
corded rate of 12.2%, but nevertheless suggestive of a very
inflationary monetary climate.
17. That is, inflation was forecasted for 1971.3 using pre-
vious money-supply growth, and this forecast amount was
then used as the lagged dependent-variable value for
1971.3 in subsequent quarters, and so on. Thus, no actual
1971.3-1975.4 inflation information was used in generating
these simulations, although actual money-supply growth
was used.
18. Also, allowance was made for the effects of automatic
transfers (ATS) onM-1. Due to the emergence of ATS, it's
clear that M-1 demand would grow at a slower rate than
previously, and therefore that a given rate of M-1 growth
would be more inflationary immediately after the inception of
ATS than before its inception. The Federal Reserve Board
of Governors Staff estimates that ATS had about a 1.5%
effect on M-1 growth in late 1978 and early 1979, by which
time the effect was largely completed. Therefore, in these
simulations, the actual levels of M-1 were increased by
0.75% in 1978.4, and by 1.5% in 1979.1 and 1979.2, so
that M-1 growth rates in 1978.4 and 1979 were both in-
creased by 0.75 percentage points. Other aggregates were
not altered.
In order to continue the simulations through 1981.4, growth
rates for the aggregates in the 1980.1-1981.4 period were
assumed to be 5% for M-1, based on the current midpoint
of the Federal Reserve's long-run target ranges.
19. That is, these simulations use actual money-supply
growth through 1979.4. Since they are therefore conditioned
on this information, they are not true forecasts.
20. The simulations or "conditional forecasts" shown in
Table 4 represent the compounded sum of quarterly inflation
forecasts for the year in question. Thus, they represent
December/December or fourth-quarter/fourth-quarter mea-
sures of inflation. For this reason, lists of forecasts appearing
in Euromoney (1978, 1979) and Business Week (1977,
1978) are not included in Table 4, since those forecasts
were apparently on a year/year basis (using yearly average
price levels). Still, this exclusion weakens the present pa-
per's results, if anything, since the excluded forecasts are
all much lower than the Table 4 results.
The forecasts shown in Table 4 were all computed on a
fourth-quarter/fourth-quarter basis from published forecasts.
In passing, it can be shown that year/year inflation figures
inevitably involve heavy use of previously available figures,
so that the ability to forecast December/December inflation
rates is a better gauge of the predictive power of a given
forecasting technique.
21. Actually, in view of the eight-to-ten quarter lag that
occurs before money-supply expansion has had its full ef-
fect on inflation-implied by the equations estimated here
and found in many other studies-the use of actual money-
supply growth has little effect on predicted inflation rates in
the first year of each simulation. The effect is probably less
than half a percentage point, compared to simulations us-
ing, say, the midpoints of Federal Reserve target ranges or
other forecasts of money-supply growth. Thus, the simula-
tion predictions are in fact probably close to money-supply-
based forecasts that might have been made at the dates
shown.